(Friday, July 6, 11am)
The cephalopod molluscs, with their large brain and flexible behavior, are good candidates for having complex cognition and consciousness. Octopuses have manipulative abilities and skin display system, but they are nonsocial. Squid, in contrast, are lifelong members of social groups and have complex skin display systems, used mainly during reproduction. Does this add a necessary dimension for a social sense of self? Males and females exchange skin displays during courtship; they can exhibit lateralized displays, one display to an individual on one side and a different one to an individual on the other. Agonistic male-male Zebra displays are carefully quantified as an indicator of dominance and culminate in formal display contests. Subordinates can produce a misleading intensity of Zebra displays, interrupt a male-female courtship sequence, and take advantage of a distraction to mate in a ‘sneaker’ situation. The extent to which squid actually monitor these displays is not yet known, so it is still uncertain whether they can evaluate their relative display performance to judge their sense of self.
Mather, J. (2016). Mating games squid play: reproductive behaviour and sexual skin displays in Caribbean reef squid Sepioteuthis sepioidea. Marine and Freshwater Behaviour and Physiology, 49(6), 359-373.
Mather, J. A. (2004). Cephalopod skin displays: from concealment to communication. Evolution of communication systems, 193-214. (Copy available from author: mather@uleth.ca)
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2013). Cephalopods and the evolution of the mind. Pacific Conservation Biology, 19(1), 4-9.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016). Other minds: The Octopus, the sea, and the deep origins of consciousness. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fascinating presentation! Thank you so much!
ReplyDeleteI’m trying to understand hetero specific theory of mind. Looking at anthropocentrism of humans, I’m trying to imagine if squids are squid-centric! Is the inference of the other’s predator made from the same basic behaviors (or mental states) they display themselves? Or is this theory of mind constructed from experience ?
Interesting, I like the idea that our way of looking at other animals, that is often considered as anthropocentric, could also be view as us applying our theory of mind to them. In humans though, young children do not have the theory of mind, they develop it. Is it related to experience, or related to the development of the brain and nervous system? That I’m not sure, but if we are to say that both species have a theory of mind, we have to be talking about the same thing, right?
DeleteWhat do you mean by a "theory of mind," and what evidence do you think was presented that squid have a "theory of mind"?
DeleteResponse From Jennifer Mather:
DeleteTo Doyon: Squid may be squid-centric in terms of reacting to predators, because they are cannibals. But I expect there’s a general acquisition of which fish species are dangerous, how much and under what circumstances. Many squid have damage from predation, and they are around others so might easily see predation attempts on others. Remember they seem to compute distance, speed of approach and size for each advance.
To L’Allier: Yes, theory of mind should develop as a combination of neural maturity and experience. Very tiny paralarval squid don’t seem to have this learning capacity and flexibility (York & Bartol. J of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 480, 26-35) and instead have stereotyped ‘reflex’ reactions to predators.
To Harnad: ‘Theory of mind’ in the sense that the squid have calculated the danger to themselves based on the different fish species’ immediate motivation, and calculate the complex of distance, speed of approach and size to make this result. I always had trouble understanding what motivated the bar jacks and the squid’s variable response to them. To me the snapper and the jack were physically and presumably motivationally similar, but not to the squid. Squid didn’t make startle dots to the yellowtail, but often did so to the jack. Remember these approaches were not immediately threatening, just possibly. To a real menace like the horse-eyed jack, the squid were gone before we even saw the predator, this was an energetic trade-off situation, and remember—eight times per hour.
Les calmars adultes semblent comprendre mieux que les jeunes calmars les risques potentiels face à des prédateurs. Ainsi, il est intéressant de remarquer qu’ils s’améliorent dans la calculation du risque. Ils sont en quelque sorte en mesure de faire la bonne inférence selon le contexte. Il semble y avoir quelque chose comme une théorie de l’esprit d’impliquer dans ces inférences bien qu’elle n’ait probablement rien à voir avec celle de l’être humain. Néanmoins, on dirait bien qu’ils sont capable d’inférer les intentions d’autres organismes se situant dans leur environnement, ce qui n’est pas rien.
ReplyDeleteHow do you distinguish "inferring intentions" from "predicting behavior"?
DeleteResponse From Jennifer Mather:
DeleteTo Meehan: (Sorry, my French isn’t good enough to reply in) Yes, it’s as if experience has taught the adults enough that they can make nuanced decisions about risk, much better than what I might call ‘jumpy’ juveniles.
To Harnad: "What is the difference between ‘inferring intentions’ and ‘predicting behavior’? " Subtle. PB is knowing or guessing the actions that will occur. II is presuming the central motivation behind the actions, much harder because there is not a tight link.
I am thinking that I'm not sure at which extent we can evaluate the skin display systems and performances of the squids to judge, or conclude, on the sense of self of the squid. Indeed, as it was said at some point during the summer class, we can't only base the fact that animals/individuals have a counsciousness because they can feel pain, for example. In my opinion, it would be "shorten" to say that because squids can exchange skin for the reproduction, therefore they do have a sense of self. However, are there any other facts that maybe were observed during other researches that could add the possibility of a sense of self in the squid?
ReplyDeleteResponse From Jennifer Mather:
DeleteTo Gadoury: That is a very difficult question and one that I did not tackle in my talk. I think I would approach it through the agonistic behavior, that I see in skin displays. So a male squid appears to have a clear knowledge of his ‘resource-holding potential’. Because the agonistic Zebra display can be very finely graded, the squid only gives as intense a display as necessary to indicate his ‘ownership’ of a female that he is consorting with to a rival. If the rival gets close, he will indicate that he is still the dominant by increasing the display intensity, yet it is still always more than the other male’s. The ritualized display contest fascinated me here because it was as if they ‘know’ their relative rank before the actual contest, and established relative position and display based on that. Yet this precision falls apart when a small male challenges a big male about to mate, and this seems deceptive to me. It does result in the courtship breaking off and the bigger male instead displaying back to or even chasing off the smaller one. And interruption of courtship can benefit the smaller male, who will one day (not long in the future) grow to be a dominant.
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ReplyDeleteThank you for the talk! It was interesting to see how squids can change their skin color in a signaling way rather than to camouflage as the octopuses. I was still wondering why someone would consider those skin changes as a “language”, as I understand it is only a parage to attract a partner or to make another male go away. We can do a parallel with other animals that are colorful to attract a female and other tactic. I asked you this question at the panel session, but I didn’t understand the answer, sorry.
ReplyDeleteThanks for showing us your work. I was impressed by how you manage to do your research using observational techniques in nature instead of in a laboratory setting. I was wondering if you had any insight into whether it feels like anything for a squid to turn on and off their light displays, and if you observed anything like an emotional response to the light displays of other squid. I know that you said it was a relatively low energy operation, but I was hoping you could elaborate. thanks!
ReplyDeleteThank you very much for the talk. In humans, women tend to be better at theory of mind tasks, both from a cognitive and afective theory of mind and 1st and 2nd degree theory of mind. Are female squid better from a survival perspective? Furthermore, from a developmental perspective, theory of mind abilities in humans tends to decline with age. Is it the same within squids, or don’t they live long enough to see this decline?
ReplyDeleteI really appreciated the very respectful and sensible notion of ethics Dr Mathers considers when making researchs with animals. As I previously knew nothing about squids, I listened the presentation with a great interest, and in the aftermath I wanted to have more information about the way cephalopods feel pain or nociception. I've found accidentally this article about a practice I didn't know, which raises obvious ethical issues. In addition, the expert sollicited for the interview was Dr Mathers herself: https://munchies.vice.com/en_us/article/vvxzzx/how-an-octopus-feels-when-its-eaten-alive
ReplyDeleteHere is some other links:
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphys.2018.01049/abstract
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3938841/
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305815545_Why_are_cephalopods_protected_in_scientific_research_in_Europe
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4767780/
Comme les calmars n’ont pas d’exosquelettes, ils sont des proies faciles. Ils doivent donc utiliser plusieurs mécanismes pour se défendre ou éviter d’être des proies. Ils semblent ajuster leurs comportements de fuites et la coloration des points sur leur corps selon le prédateur potentiel qu’ils rencontrent et la direction par laquelle il approche. Aussi, avec l’expérience, ils changent leur comportement de fuite : les adultes semblent plus prudent que les juvéniles. Le défi est de savoir si ce comportement est conscient ou s’il est le résultat d’un système de calcul qui optimise les chances de survie de l’organisme.
ReplyDeleteMême si ce n’est pas une espèce sociale, les calmars semblent communiquer lorsqu’ils utilisent le «zebra signal». Pendant qu’il courtise une femelle, un des mâle émet beaucoup de colorations tachetés, peut-être pour signaler à l’autre mâle de s’éloigner. Personnellement, je me demande si ce mécanisme est vraiment un moyen de communication ou peut-être juste un comportement sexuel. Les femelles utilisent-elles aussi le signal?