In regards to the discussion about how intelligent other animals are I recommend reading this recent article by Maggie Koerth-Baker: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/humans-are-dumb-at-figuring-out-how-smart-animals-are/?ex_cid=story-twitter
I have to say, only a few days into the summer school and I need to revisit some of my assumptions about the minds of non-human animals. Yet anthropocentrism seems our only way to understand what it means to be sentient.
My question was inspired by the work of one of your experts with the dogs from a Korean farm. A few years ago, I enrolled in a MOOC (massive open online course) by The Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies - University of Edinburgh about animal welfare. The purpose of this class was to teach the sole clinical (and western) perspective, independantly of the ethical debate- so, how to treat « correctly », without cruelty, farm and zoo animals. In this particular perspective, the expressed position was that certain animals were considered « farm-able » (and so, eatable) and some others not because of mainly 2 reasons : 1) The more or less gregarious nature of the species- so, animals usually living in herds were considered able to be raised and kept in a farm 2) The fact that some species have body features that make less likely the probability they would be able to hurt seriously each others. So, ungulate species were farmable but not dogs or cats who can bite and have claws. I think in general these arguments are debatable even in the clinical-only perspective : Alligators, a non-gregarious species, are nevertheless farmed in the south-east of the USA, and some other species are often trimmed when breeded in a large number (ex. chicken, beak-trimmed to avoid pecking of the peers). I would like to know what the experts think about it.
From an evolutionary perspective, do you think that the ability of an animal to be conscious of his own state of mind precede the ability to project a state off mind to a conspecific or vice versa?? What is your gut feeling about that?
You mention in the debate that one of the biggest issue regarding the other minds involves acting and assuming that they don’t feel anything and being wrong. There is no way for us to be sure, so we are left with probabilities and uncertainty. Therefor we should be very cautious and set a very low bar for the amount of evidence required to attribute sentience to a living organism. But we need a place to start. So I wonder, are there indicators of “non-sentience” (beside not being alive like rocks)? For example, if a simple organism was only capable of reflex reactions, could we say that it is not sentient?
In regards to the discussion about how intelligent other animals are I recommend reading this recent article by Maggie Koerth-Baker: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/humans-are-dumb-at-figuring-out-how-smart-animals-are/?ex_cid=story-twitter
ReplyDelete"Humans Are Dumb At Figuring Out How Smart Animals Are" by Maggie Koerth-Baker
DeleteThanks you for the link!
DeleteI have to say, only a few days into the summer school and I need to revisit some of my assumptions about the minds of non-human animals. Yet anthropocentrism seems our only way to understand what it means to be sentient.
DeleteMy question was inspired by the work of one of your experts with the dogs from a Korean farm. A few years ago, I enrolled in a MOOC (massive open online course) by The Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies - University of Edinburgh about animal welfare. The purpose of this class was to teach the sole clinical (and western) perspective, independantly of the ethical debate- so, how to treat « correctly », without cruelty, farm and zoo animals. In this particular perspective, the expressed position was that certain animals were considered « farm-able » (and so, eatable) and some others not because of mainly 2 reasons :
ReplyDelete1) The more or less gregarious nature of the species- so, animals usually living in herds were considered able to be raised and kept in a farm
2) The fact that some species have body features that make less likely the probability they would be able to hurt seriously each others. So, ungulate species were farmable but not dogs or cats who can bite and have claws.
I think in general these arguments are debatable even in the clinical-only perspective : Alligators, a non-gregarious species, are nevertheless farmed in the south-east of the USA, and some other species are often trimmed when breeded in a large number (ex. chicken, beak-trimmed to avoid pecking of the peers). I would like to know what the experts think about it.
From an evolutionary perspective, do you think that the ability of an animal to be conscious of his own state of mind precede the ability to project a state off mind to a conspecific or vice versa?? What is your gut feeling about that?
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteWhat role or function does emotion have in your research?
ReplyDeleteAnd for Kristin, what is the relationship between emotion and consciousness?
- Mr Harnad,
ReplyDeleteYou mention in the debate that one of the biggest issue regarding the other minds involves acting and assuming that they don’t feel anything and being wrong. There is no way for us to be sure, so we are left with probabilities and uncertainty. Therefor we should be very cautious and set a very low bar for the amount of evidence required to attribute sentience to a living organism. But we need a place to start. So I wonder, are there indicators of “non-sentience” (beside not being alive like rocks)? For example, if a simple organism was only capable of reflex reactions, could we say that it is not sentient?
- Dr Berns,
ReplyDeleteYou mentioned that emotion is a global state that is forward looking, and that humans look at it backwards.
By forward looking, do you mean expectation or apprehension?
What do you mean by looking at it backward?
- Dr Berns,
ReplyDeleteYou briefly talked about a dissociative pain killer used for some medical procedures.
If I understand correctly, this molecule does not block the pain sensation but rather interfered with the encoding in memory.
Did it prevent the encoding of the whole experience (episodic memory) or just the memory of the pain (sensory memory) ?