WORKSHOP 3: Steven M. Wise:
(Thursday, June 28, 7:30pm)
There are several potential legal paths for according sentient beings rights and protection under the law. The Nonhuman Rights Project is working to win legal rights for nonhuman animals in the US through a state-by-statelong-term litigation campaign via habeas corpus lawsuits demanding recognition of the legal personhood and fundamental right to bodily liberty of individual great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales held in captivity across the US. In addition to the work in the US, legal working groups in England, Spain, France, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Portugal, Argentina, Israel, Turkey, India, and Australia are being set up collaboratively to develop nonhuman rights campaigns suited to the respective legal systems of each of these countries.
Andrews, K., Crozier, G., Donaldson, S., Fenton, A., Johnson, L. S. M., Jones, R., ... & Rocha, J. (2018). The Philosophers' Brief on Chimpanzee Personhood.
When an “it” gain the status of legal person, it is recognize as having privileges and obligation, the ability to sue and to be sued… How do you legally deal with the responsibility of an legal person forest, lac or river, to not fulfill it’s obligation?
ReplyDeleteI agree with you. If we want to give more rights to any living being other than human, we should just create a judge-made law, since common law gives you that possibility, assessing their right to not be considered as a property but a sentient being. Why not drop the "habeas corpus" case and take the time to form laws regarding non-humans, due to the fact that every specie has its particularity?
DeleteI think the only way a river could not fulfill its obligation(s) was if humans would go and pollute that river, raze that forest, etc. The environment usually balances itself with animal populations around. There is a great example of wolf reintroduction in (I think) the Rocky Mountains and the long-term effect on basically evertyhing, bringing balance to deer population but also ultimately helping rivers and forests, etc. If that river ends up not fulfilling its role of let’s say bringing water to local communities, well we have to climb up that chain of effect and investigate who is at the source of all the problems in the environment, and humans are likely to be the problem in most cases (at least in our condition right now).
DeleteChildren and handicapped are legal persons and have no obligations. But their rights can be represented in court.
DeleteMr. Wise is quite right in his strategy. 2 days ago, critical anthropocentrism was presented by Mr. Burghardt as a good strategy to update our representation of non-human animals by using our biases. Kathrin was right too, sharing the information is key! There must be some way to network different groups of scientists and jurists – a bit like a translation project.
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, thanks for your implication for making this world a better world.
ReplyDeleteYour talk made me think about the fondation of the concept of right. I came to the idea that according rights to animals imply to consider rights like independants of «humans constructions». Otherwise, we should talk about law adressed to humans but it seems that rights belong to animals even if humans are not imply. In this point of view, I think that the only right that seems to belong to animals is the right to satisfy their biologicals imperatives. Maybe the right of liberty come with it?
I see problems with the right of liberty. If we give the right of liberty to champanzees, can we still protect them by, for exemple, defining limits for their territory. If it's the case, I see there a kind of restriction of their liberty.
And, for cats and dogs, liberty can be a bad thing. I mean, there are types of animals that are really dependants of humans. You said that there's differents types of right for differents types of animals. But you also said that autonomy is the criterion for giving the right of liberty. But what happen if we realise that cat's and dog's are autonomous (what I believe to be the case)?
Rights can (but need not) include "liberty" in the sense of freedom to roam. Mentally handicapped people have rights, but not necessarily the freedom to roam.
Delete"Autonomy" is a vague concept. If it needs to be used with judges, so be it -- but that does not make it more coherent. Biological imperatives, both positive (what needs to be done for animals) and negative (what may not be done to animals) can be specified in the law, species by species, based on biological and psychological science. Perhaps "autonomy" can be re-packaged in terms of species-specific biological imperatives.
You bring a very nice perspective in our discussion. I agree with most of your arguments, but I can’t assume all of their consequences.
ReplyDeleteYou reject utilitarians arguments on the basis that it could undermine basic human rights. I totally agree with that. Benefits of experimental study for human health should not be considered as a valid argument, because we don’t want anybody to be deprived from their right to integrity even if it could benefit to many. That being said, I think we can’t fall either into a Kantian deontological like argument, which would argue that our action must obey to a categorical imperative or universal law. If we have two autonomous sentient beings and that I have to choose which one survive, I think that it is better to save one, rather than to let both die based on the impossibility to threat one or the other as a mean to the well being of the other.
More concretely, for example, there are non-human invasive animals, some starfish, who are literally eating coral reef. Considering coral reef are of a crucial importance for global carbon dioxide regulation, we deliberatly are killing these starfish for the well being of the oceans and our. We can’t just pick those starfish and bring them to another coral reef; this could threaten another reef in turn. Like it has already being said yesterday, doing nothing is sometime worst than doing something. How could we reconciliate this with the non-human rights project?
Thank you.
There can be conflicts of material interest (e.g. financial) and there can be conflicts of vital interest (i.e., life or death), between individuals and between groups, within- and between-species.
DeleteEven in the case of human/human interaction, for example, there has to be the right of self-defense.
So legislation cannot be absolute; it depends on context. It is important (for credibility and practicality) not to over-reach.
Today, when humans are causing other species horrific suffering for non-vital interests (food preferences, fur, fashion, sport, entertainment) it is not a good strategy to dilute the case against causing this completely gratuitous suffering by mixing it with suffering caused out of conflict of vital interest (such as in that minority of biomedical research that is potentially life-saving).
I can personally choose to renounce the benefits of biomedical research for myself, but I cannot renounce it for you. While the planet is still causing animals gratuitous suffering at monstrous levels, it is not yet the time to call for everyone to renounce the benefits of potentially life-saving biomedical research (though it is certainly justifiable to call for renouncing the portion of biomedical research that is not potentially life-saving, but driven primarily by curiosity and career, as if research that causes suffering to sentient animals were on a par with research on insentient materials in other sciences).
Once causing gratuitous suffering is illegal, the question of human/animal conflicts of vital interest can be considering from a fair and realistic perspective, rather than pre-emptively diluting the case against causing suffering out of non-vital interest with the case against causing suffering out of vital interest.
I think I understand your point, especially about right of self-defense and when you say that legislation cannot be absolute, depending on context… That being said, my intention is not to “dilute” gratuitous suffering in suffering caused out of conflict of vital interest (as in biomedical research or in ecology). On the contrary, I think that we should strategically base our ethic on ecology, precisely for the sake of credibility and practicality. To protect sentient beings, maybe the best way is to raise ecological concern via the economical value of functional diversity. “L’argent est le nerf de la guerre.”
DeleteIt is not clear how ecology can tell us how we should treat animals purpose-bred for human use, nor whether it is ethical to use them for food, fur, fashion or entertainment -- or biomedical research, for that matter.
DeleteAs to tampering with ecology "in the wild": Our species has already caused so much gratuitous damage and suffering ("collateral damage") with encroachment, importation and "culling" that it should really be left to ecological experts to determine whether and when it is safer to intervene than to refrain from interfering.
Je comprends qu’il faut attribuer le statut de «personne» aux animaux non-humains pour défendre leur droit et bien les protéger, mais je n’aime pas le choix du mot. Je pense que «être sensible» décrit davantage l’animal. Aussi, il a été mentionné que le biologique n’est pas important pour attribuer à quelqu’un le statut de «personne». Par exemple, une rivière pourrait être une « personne». Pour moins, le biologique est un aspect primordiale du ressenti, à moins que l’on parle d’un robot avec des capteurs sensori-moteurs très développés ou un système très complexe de traitement de l’information autonome.
ReplyDeleteComme l’on dit les panelistes, il est vrai qu’il est étrange pour nous d’utiliser le terme personne pour une rivière, mais c’est que selon la loi et selon que une personne est dans la loi, c’est les aspects légaux reliés au statut de personne et d’utiliser cela pour protéger les entités (qu’elles soient vivantes ou non).
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DeleteComme l'a fait remarquer Simon, on accorde déjà le statut juridique de « personne » aux entreprises, aux fleuves et aux temples, et ce ne sont même ni des êtres vivants ni des êtres sensibles. C'est juste une catégorie juridique formelle qui permet de défendre les intérêts de ces entités devant le tribunal.
DeleteIdem pour l'attribut de « l'autonomie », si ça aide à induire le tribunal à accorder le statut de personne juridique aux chimpanzés et aux éléphants.
Une autre option prometteuse serait celle qu'utiliseront Me Roy et Me Morello ici au Quebec à la place du statut de personne: le statut de être sensible ayant les impératifs biologiques (la loi BÊSA).
Mr. Wise a fait remarquer que les juges ne définissent pas le concept d’autonomie (fonctionnant pourtant comme critère de l’attribution du statut de personne légale). Jonathan Birch a soulevé la possibilité qu’il puisse être compris comme la capacité d’agir relativement à des désirs que nous endossons, donc essentiellement, comme des désirs que nous désirons avoir. Cette définition de l’autonomie, que j’admets également possible chez l’humain, me semble difficilement défendable chez les animaux non-humains, même chez les grands singes. Ms. Jensvold a quant à elle parlé de l’autonomie comme d’un trait associé à la capacité de planifier, soit de se projeter dans le temps. Cette définition m’apparaît beaucoup plus généreuse dans son inclusivité, bien qu’elle demeure quelque peu confuse.
DeleteL’autonomie entendue en ces termes est-elle vraiment un bon argument pour la lutte des droits des animaux? Serait-il possible de la définir plutôt au niveau de l’action volontaire, soit d’une certaine liberté décisionnel (qui s’étend à une très vaste majorité d’animaux non-humain selon les conférences des dernières semaines)?
Je crois qu’explorer le concept d’autonomie dans le monde animal peut aider, mais ne convainquera pas à lui seul.
As a law student, I totally agree with M. Wise when he says judges are prudent, diligent and want to make the right thing. As a judge, taking a decision/side on a case can be very dangerous. They have to make sure their decision is going to be accepted by all.
ReplyDeleteI think there is a parallel that can be made with conformity here. Two days ago, we were talking about social norms in the panel of primates, voles and worms. When M. Wise said that the judges wanted to decide on things they were only certain, in a certain margin, that it would be accepted by the public, but also the other judges at the next diner, it made me think of the way primates can sometimes act regarding a Chimpanzee that didn’t act the way he was supposed to. In a certain way, I feel that social norms are very important in a group, but are part of the problem here. It’s a constant circle: we need change, but for a judge to make a decision in our favor, we need social change and for social change we need a judge to make a decision in our favor!
This talk was very inspiring to me (and I suppose to every law students who were also listening to the talk). It is very refreshing to hear this man talk about his own experience. I can’t believe he has been one of the first to teach animal rights law. Can’t wait to see the continuity of this lawsuits saga!
Thanks for the interesting talk. I don't know very much about the law, but I thought your comment about the law not being sterile was very interesting, and was curious about how you modified the way you pursue and present cases according to the values and beliefs that judges hold. I was wondering about how you investigate what values judges hold and if there are any legal issues surrounding this this sort of investigation (i.e. is it illegal to target a judge based on their specific situation, etc.).
ReplyDeleteQu’est-ce qui différencie une chose d’une personne? Pour plusieurs, une personne serait synonyme d’humain. Or, l’histoire nous montre qu’il y a eu un temps où les esclaves, par exemple, étaient considérés comme de simples choses par la loi. Ainsi, comme le dit le conférencier, ce qui fait une personne d’une chose n’est pas la biologie. On peut espérer qu’éventuellement les animaux non humains soient considérés par la loi comme étant des “personnes légales” et non des “choses légales”. Il est important de leur donner des droits et non seulement une protection de leur bien-être, car sans des droits on ne protège pas d’une manière acceptable. C’est pourquoi le “Nonhuman Rights Project” est une très belle initiative.
ReplyDeleteAt a certain point, people were arguing that there was a certain paradox that M. Wise was only representing nonhuman animals that have higher cognitive capacities. I totally agree with M. Wise when he said that we need to start somewhere and that it is easier to prove to jurists that a chimpanzee has rights than a rat. If he was representing other species, e.g. rats or birds, jurists wouldn’t take him seriously, so there would be no advance in animal rights. So, as I understand it, the point of biology is not fundamentally important, but he needs to be understand by jurists and it is easier to have their empathy with animals that are closer to the description of personhood in law.
ReplyDeleteThank you very much for the talk, it was really interesting.
ReplyDeleteIn the book Zoopolis – A Political Theory of Animal Rights, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka present a world were animals would be considered not only as persons, but as full citizens of our society. They posit that animals that can exercise choice (dogs, primates with higher cognitive functions) should not only be represented in political debates, but that they should be given the right to vote on issues that concern them. In your opinion, and considering the potential challenges that this would entail (language is definitely one of them), how realistic would this be? Do you foresee a future where this could become reality for certain animals?
I understood that Mr Wise's strategy is to target a particularly empathetic (and autonomy-loving) judge's personal definition of autonomy... hoping that she/he may attribute that biased definition to as many animals as possible, while at the same time not backtracking completely out of fear of creating a legal slippery slope. This looks hard and besides, we know that a rather simple robot can be "autonomous" in the broad sense... and yet an autistic human adult, or elderly senile person often isn't. So... that judge clearly doesn't get was autonomy means to us (it’s more like some kind of super abstract “value”) and it's up to us to decipher what it means to him/her and “exploit” that. For this to have any chance of working, the case must be presented in an appealing way, mostly relying on emotions and anthropomorphism (might work for monkeys, but we can already drop it for lobsters, salmons… > 99% of the animal kingdom, basically).
ReplyDeleteAlthough I think I get that part, what I really don't see as clearly is how current scientific research, *new* research, current animal cognition experts and their new data, etc. are expected to contribute anything at all?
We surely did not need to wait until recently to convince judges that animals can suffer. By prohibiting "undue suffering", even our outrageously outdated criminal code clearly enough implies/states that animals are capable of suffering... and those who wrote this didn't need cognitive neuroscience to help them sort it out.
At this point, what do you think animal-loving scientists can/should do to help Mr Wise in the short to medium term? The language of science seems so different from the one used in court. Consensus are rarely achieved because they're not even the goal. And even if, it seems like such a stretch to translate that into an efficient (deemed valid by the judge) argument from authority.
À l’instar du présentateur précédent, je dois me montrer plus rabat-joie que romantique… La soussignée est titulaire du diplôme de 2e cycle en droit du Barreau, a effectué également d’autres études de 2e cycle en droit international et en (bio)éthique ,et a pratiqué activement le droit plusieurs années. À ce titre, les positions de Me Wise sur l’usage du recours en habeas corpus et sur le sens des termes autonomie et personne morale me laissent très perplexe. Selon moi, l’attention du grand public et de certains étudiants (donc forcément encore novices) en droit relève surtout de l’argument d’autorité. Je crois que certains juges, pour reprendre les termes rapportés par Me Wise, ont été effectivement trop durs en qualifiant ses recours de « frivoles» compte tenu de la nature de la cause sous-jacente au véhicule procédural, mais d’autre part je comprends qu’ils aient pu être qualifiés de dilatoires par d’autres professionnels du droit. Utiliser de façon selon moi erronée un tel véhicule procédural contribue à réduire la cause à un «stunt» publicitaire de nature à attirer l’attention sur la maltraitance animale plutôt qu’à lui donner une réelle chance de succès. Avec égards et respect, la position de mon collègue juriste me semble non-orthodoxe en droit, voire excentrique, et je ne suis pas du tout surprise de la non-réceptivité des juges, même des plus sympathiques à la cause animale. L’habeas corpus, si je me fie aux nombreux professeurs m’ayant enseigné, est un recours issu du droit anglais, conservé dans notre droit et subsistant en common law nord-américaine, visant initialement à prévenir les détentions arbitraires ou sans jugement imposées en vertu du pouvoir régalien qui a évolué vers un pouvoir étatique. L’interpréter autrement en vertu d’une possible maladresse de rédaction ou d’interprétation antérieure sur le sens d’un seul mot, surtout dans un contexte de common law où c’est le plus souvent le volume de jurisprudence plutôt qu’un texte formel qui fonde le droit, me semble dénaturer la fin du recours. Réussir à gagner un tel recours risquerait selon moi de mettre le corpus juridique sur une dangereuse voie de dérapage et de même retarder l’obtention de quelque gain en faveur des animaux. Le droit américain, le tout variant selon les états, comprendrait beaucoup d’autres véhicules procéduraux beaucoup plus appropriés à assurer la protection des diverses espèces animales, fût-ce bien sûr au cas par cas, si je m’en fie aux écrits et aux jugements obtenus par d’autres juristes américains. Me Wise aurait lui-même commandé une opinion juridique à ce sujet à Me Richard Cupp (v. p. 518 du document) qui m’apparaît bien fondée, et je m’étonne qu’elle n’ait pas été plus mise à profit : https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1797&context=pelr
ReplyDeleteJe ne puis qu’adhérer plutôt aux positions et aux méthodes exprimées par Mes Roy et Morello qui, quoiqu’exercées en contexte de droit québécois (et depuis récemment sous les principes de la loi BÊSA), trouvent néanmoins des parallèles en droit étranger
Considering that a computer does not fear being unplugged, as an animal can fear for its life.
ReplyDelete- If AI’s do get legal rights, does this mean animals would automatically get them too?