If pain, its affect, or the unpleasantness of pain, can be dissociate from nociceptor but are not confined to only one specific brain region, by redundancy between brain regions or brain plasticity, not sure that comparative study can help that much to know if non human animal cannot feel pain… That being said, from this standing point, what do we do with Popper’s falsification criterion? I mean, is it still possible to falsify the claim that a given non human animal feel pain or the opposite claim as well?
(1) Distributed functions can be studied too, not just local ones.
(2) Don't look to Popper for solving the other-minds problem through a direct measurement of something that is measurable directly only by the subject (the one who feels). But that does not mean that we cannot do it by inference from correlates (and probability).
(1) I agree that even if comparative study can't be used to say that non-human animal CANNOT feel, following what it has been said, we can use other approaches like distributed functions. My point was rather to raise the fact that during the summer school comparative studies premises was almost always in background and that I'm not sure now if it is really necessary or helpful to scientifically solve the other-mind problem.
(2) I understand why you don't want that we appeal to Popper criterion in that case. First, the risk is to discredit our efforts to convince the public on animal sentience, threatening the scientificity of our approach, which is not my aim. Secondly, as you advocate, something that is directly measurable only by the subject who feel seems to be impossible to falsify. As you say however, maybe it is still possible to falsify inference from correlates via probability. I think it could rightly be a mean to advocate animal sentience to demonstrate that even if it could be falsified scientifically by an experimental procedure, it is not, and therefore that non-human animals are sentient. Once again, I come back to the point that it is maybe surprisingly easier to demonstrate that non-human animal CANNOT be NOT sentient than to try to demonstrate that they are sentient.
Someone in the audience brought up during the panel the question of whether we should keep captivity or half-captivity to protect the animals from the “dangers” of nature. I think that’s a wrong way of seeing the issue of animal welfare, because when we speak of this issue, it’s in the context of human control or power over the animals. We want to protect these animals that are in these situations from harm. We have a responsibility towards those animals in which we are in proximity and that are threatened by our mere presence. Also, who can expect to be able to hold every animals that are in the wild in captivity and in BETTER condition from all the animals in the wild at the moment. I don’t know how many individuals there are in t but good luck capturing them all. Plus, if ever you find a way of individually capturing every single individual of every species and putting them together in captivity (maybe mixing them with individuals from other species, how can you expect nature to sustain itself? Every species are necessary in preserving the aspects of life in the wild (I’m talking here about plants as well). For instance, a lot of species are seed dispersers, removing those animals means you disrupt the environement significantly.
Please let me suggest two moral priorities for the human species (the only species that has moral obligations, because it is the only species capable of them -- though it is not the only species with a rudimentary sense of fairness, and even some enforcement of fairness in some primate societies):
-- 1. The first and overwhelming priority is to do anything we can, individually or collectively, to put an end to the monstrous and unpardonable enormity of gratuitous harm that we are inflicting on other sentients, by far the most of it on members of sentient species other than our own (both purpose-bred and wildlife).
"Gratuitous harm" means harm that is not vital for our own survival and health.
-- 2. The second priority is to minimize the harm we inflict on other sentients (human and nonhuman, purpose-bred and wildlife) because of an inescapable conflict between our vital needs (survival and health) and theirs.
Practical morality cannot be based on a general call to sacrifice one's own vital needs (as in suicide-bombing).
As to tampering with ecology, our species has already done disastrously much of that already. We should try to restore and preserve the autonomy of wildlife, not tamper even more, in ecological ignorance, whether well-meant or ill-.
Interesting publication about one of this discussion's topics (the challenges in the research involving invertebrates): https://watermark.silverchair.com/ilar-52-213.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAcswggHHBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggG4MIIBtAIBADCCAa0GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMnDqT8pLGAth5TPCgAgEQgIIBfsNCRmeQOeD1CTe_dEQ-3GU7OAw8PvzorwZnjQsXSpgLeBB_QQJg0WV9r5TcMX9o-8GWEkd-o81e_LLo9Q7acFUQ4_aRo_MADINMXgys5xs_kq-MI1hykf6p8Aq6ckASiFx8UTxI4qmNm6E-mRyJ7KxFWnUEhDIlgKYcYxh5rTrZiNfM-_a375NT2UlMcNkXsq63BppTLfxLe28KTrpcqO7dJ_M0IQ-qddtuqhD8yASfr_czfO987c8Dqtzmcc1F8urwT3MzD8b4a1TSQoJmVbUm7gNr-XB1kwTe8T4XzVr5oOE92dR7a8768l9OtFB6sUOK9zWLlYdG2DLLT6o4lOibST5ahQskOvyCeNTAUvWsCPhAQX_e-KSwUL5amaq5PFmQ644AQOh_X-KZJzOZkH4eGKLOgFKOUwApnxASClgtXDHDOBvJg6D7JWiJF918uv6FqNbLgqiu9ttvjK7bqK-rcpqPom9myC73ZEzykAU4VZijenCn4TWDRBcrytk IACUC is "Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee".
No. This is an article by Chris Harvey-Clark, and this is really the link when copie and pasted!!! Don't know why it doesn't work or is so long... I've found the same article on another page, here is the link: https://academic.oup.com/ilarjournal/article/52/2/213/659971
The questions I asked Professor Chittka were: does every honeybees colony has the same waggle dance and, if not, is it possible for them to learn another dance?; do they have to learn their dance from other individuals?
His answers were that the waggle dance seems to be innate, but that there are differences in the dance from a colony to another, like different dialects. So, there must be a learning processus as well to really masterise the dance. On that point, Pr. Chittka also said that different bees were able to learn the dance of another colony! I found the article of that study: East Learns from West: Asiatic Honeybees Can Understand Dance Language of European Honeybees http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0002365
M. Reber, 2 days ago presented a new theory for the origin of sentience. Sentience was for him something very old and basically emerged with life itself. He said that sentience was a TYPE of cognition ; as for the diverse phenomenology of subjective sentience (between species), those are nothing but TOKENS of the same type. Would you agree with that statement? If not, do we explain the variety of sentience as the same adaptation emerging multiple time in evolution? + M. Hendrix, also speaking of non-vertebrates (worms were his models) explained that sentience was the process of comparison between the top down process predicting what is expected, compared to the bottom-up signal coming from the sensory system. The analysis of the discrepancy between the 2 signals is what M. Hendrix identified as sentience - the capacity to feel. In that sense, there was no need for a central nervous system or any particular circuitry to prove sentience. Do you think this definition is sufficient to account for sentience in invertebrates? If not, what is missing from it ?
I would like to know if those frame could help make a case for invertebrate's sentience.
To say that things are tokens of the same type is to say there is something general of which they are particular cases. But to say it is so is is not quite enough: Why should we believe that all living things are sentient (any more than we should believe panspychism, according to which all things are sentient)?
If sentience were just the comparison between "top-down" and "bottom-up" processes, Gregory Dudek's mobile robots would be sentient...
Regarding the aspect of studies on animals, I agree with one of the comments of Jennifer Mather when she says that even in the natural habitat of animals, we can modify their comportment. She gives the example of an octopus who will modify his actions and be less on guards if humans are around which makes them vulnerable for predators. She says that we can’t wait for the proof to give the right of life to every animal because it will be too late. She also says the criteria of self-other-conscience doesn’t work and everything is very specific to every animal: we can’t do an experiment with many octopuses: they will kill each other. I find this aargument interesting since I am of the ones thinking intelligence is a matter of adaptation in your environment. I think there is no genereal criterion that we can apply to every species for saying one is sentient and deserves to be protected and the other is not.
Prof. Mather argued that all scientists should adopt a school and told us how she is giving the example. Earlier, Joshua Plotnik also showed us how he is applying that sort of principle in Asia. Following that, a student had commented that being given a chance to interact emotionally with the elephants might be the best way to prevent them treating them badly after they become adults, encouraging the ivory trade, etc.
Each animal cognition researcher adopting an elementary school worldwide definitely sounds like a great idea. But I also could think of counter arguments people would use to argue against generalizing this practice: kids nowadays have so much in their curriculum. Why not instead add philosophy? Logic? What shall will we remove in order to fit X in?
Prof Mathers, who teaches in Alberta, replied that she went straight to the teachers and that as long as it's presented in an entertaining way, it's compatible with the local curriculum. Also, it's a once per years kind of event. Prof Dukas added that it's already being done in the USA, as part of an established program.
Thank you very much for the talk, it was very interesting. During the panel, I asked if there was a hardwired process in humans that would make our generalized fear or disgust response to insects and Jennifer mentioned there was none and it was mostly education. Could you elaborate on your approach or the particular angle that you would advise to take to change the mind of people in regards to them? More specifically, do you think the approach in cognitive and behavioral therapy of exposition and prevention of response possible with such insects as mosquitoes?
If pain, its affect, or the unpleasantness of pain, can be dissociate from nociceptor but are not confined to only one specific brain region, by redundancy between brain regions or brain plasticity, not sure that comparative study can help that much to know if non human animal cannot feel pain… That being said, from this standing point, what do we do with Popper’s falsification criterion? I mean, is it still possible to falsify the claim that a given non human animal feel pain or the opposite claim as well?
ReplyDelete(1) Distributed functions can be studied too, not just local ones.
Delete(2) Don't look to Popper for solving the other-minds problem through a direct measurement of something that is measurable directly only by the subject (the one who feels). But that does not mean that we cannot do it by inference from correlates (and probability).
This comment has been removed by the author.
Delete(1) I agree that even if comparative study can't be used to say that non-human animal CANNOT feel, following what it has been said, we can use other approaches like distributed functions. My point was rather to raise the fact that during the summer school comparative studies premises
Deletewas almost always in background and that I'm not sure now if it is really necessary or helpful to scientifically solve the other-mind problem.
(2) I understand why you don't want that we appeal to Popper criterion in that case. First, the risk is to discredit our efforts to convince the public on animal sentience, threatening the scientificity of our approach, which is not my aim. Secondly, as you advocate, something that is directly measurable only by the subject who feel seems to be impossible to falsify. As you say however, maybe it is still possible to falsify inference from correlates via probability. I think it could rightly be a mean to advocate animal sentience to demonstrate that even if it could be falsified scientifically by an experimental procedure, it is not, and therefore that non-human animals are sentient. Once again, I come back to the point that it is maybe surprisingly easier to demonstrate that non-human animal CANNOT be NOT sentient than to try to demonstrate that they are sentient.
Someone in the audience brought up during the panel the question of whether we should keep captivity or half-captivity to protect the animals from the “dangers” of nature. I think that’s a wrong way of seeing the issue of animal welfare, because when we speak of this issue, it’s in the context of human control or power over the animals. We want to protect these animals that are in these situations from harm. We have a responsibility towards those animals in which we are in proximity and that are threatened by our mere presence. Also, who can expect to be able to hold every animals that are in the wild in captivity and in BETTER condition from all the animals in the wild at the moment. I don’t know how many individuals there are in t but good luck capturing them all. Plus, if ever you find a way of individually capturing every single individual of every species and putting them together in captivity (maybe mixing them with individuals from other species, how can you expect nature to sustain itself? Every species are necessary in preserving the aspects of life in the wild (I’m talking here about plants as well). For instance, a lot of species are seed dispersers, removing those animals means you disrupt the environement significantly.
ReplyDeletePlease let me suggest two moral priorities for the human species (the only species that has moral obligations, because it is the only species capable of them -- though it is not the only species with a rudimentary sense of fairness, and even some enforcement of fairness in some primate societies):
Delete-- 1. The first and overwhelming priority is to do anything we can, individually or collectively, to put an end to the monstrous and unpardonable enormity of gratuitous harm that we are inflicting on other sentients, by far the most of it on members of sentient species other than our own (both purpose-bred and wildlife).
"Gratuitous harm" means harm that is not vital for our own survival and health.
-- 2. The second priority is to minimize the harm we inflict on other sentients (human and nonhuman, purpose-bred and wildlife) because of an inescapable conflict between our vital needs (survival and health) and theirs.
Practical morality cannot be based on a general call to sacrifice one's own vital needs (as in suicide-bombing).
As to tampering with ecology, our species has already done disastrously much of that already. We should try to restore and preserve the autonomy of wildlife, not tamper even more, in ecological ignorance, whether well-meant or ill-.
Thanks for the reply!
DeleteInteresting publication about one of this discussion's topics (the challenges in the research involving invertebrates): https://watermark.silverchair.com/ilar-52-213.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAcswggHHBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggG4MIIBtAIBADCCAa0GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMnDqT8pLGAth5TPCgAgEQgIIBfsNCRmeQOeD1CTe_dEQ-3GU7OAw8PvzorwZnjQsXSpgLeBB_QQJg0WV9r5TcMX9o-8GWEkd-o81e_LLo9Q7acFUQ4_aRo_MADINMXgys5xs_kq-MI1hykf6p8Aq6ckASiFx8UTxI4qmNm6E-mRyJ7KxFWnUEhDIlgKYcYxh5rTrZiNfM-_a375NT2UlMcNkXsq63BppTLfxLe28KTrpcqO7dJ_M0IQ-qddtuqhD8yASfr_czfO987c8Dqtzmcc1F8urwT3MzD8b4a1TSQoJmVbUm7gNr-XB1kwTe8T4XzVr5oOE92dR7a8768l9OtFB6sUOK9zWLlYdG2DLLT6o4lOibST5ahQskOvyCeNTAUvWsCPhAQX_e-KSwUL5amaq5PFmQ644AQOh_X-KZJzOZkH4eGKLOgFKOUwApnxASClgtXDHDOBvJg6D7JWiJF918uv6FqNbLgqiu9ttvjK7bqK-rcpqPom9myC73ZEzykAU4VZijenCn4TWDRBcrytk
ReplyDeleteIACUC is "Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee".
Link doesn't work. Do you mean this?
DeleteNo. This is an article by Chris Harvey-Clark, and this is really the link when copie and pasted!!! Don't know why it doesn't work or is so long... I've found the same article on another page, here is the link: https://academic.oup.com/ilarjournal/article/52/2/213/659971
DeleteThe questions I asked Professor Chittka were: does every honeybees colony has the same waggle dance and, if not, is it possible for them to learn another dance?; do they have to learn their dance from other individuals?
ReplyDeleteWhat were his answers?
DeleteHis answers were that the waggle dance seems to be innate, but that there are differences in the dance from a colony to another, like different dialects. So, there must be a learning processus as well to really masterise the dance. On that point, Pr. Chittka also said that different bees were able to learn the dance of another colony! I found the article of that study: East Learns from West: Asiatic Honeybees Can Understand Dance Language of European Honeybees http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0002365
DeleteM. Reber, 2 days ago presented a new theory for the origin of sentience. Sentience was for him something very old and basically emerged with life itself. He said that sentience was a TYPE of cognition ; as for the diverse phenomenology of subjective sentience (between species), those are nothing but TOKENS of the same type. Would you agree with that statement? If not, do we explain the variety of sentience as the same adaptation emerging multiple time in evolution?
ReplyDelete+
M. Hendrix, also speaking of non-vertebrates (worms were his models) explained that sentience was the process of comparison between the top down process predicting what is expected, compared to the bottom-up signal coming from the sensory system. The analysis of the discrepancy between the 2 signals is what M. Hendrix identified as sentience - the capacity to feel. In that sense, there was no need for a central nervous system or any particular circuitry to prove sentience. Do you think this definition is sufficient to account for sentience in invertebrates? If not, what is missing from it ?
I would like to know if those frame could help make a case for invertebrate's sentience.
Thank you!
To say that things are tokens of the same type is to say there is something general of which they are particular cases. But to say it is so is is not quite enough: Why should we believe that all living things are sentient (any more than we should believe panspychism, according to which all things are sentient)?
DeleteIf sentience were just the comparison between "top-down" and "bottom-up" processes, Gregory Dudek's mobile robots would be sentient...
@ Mr. Harnad. Thank you for that comment, it helps a lot my thinking process. I've commented on it in the PANEL 7 page.
DeleteRegarding the aspect of studies on animals, I agree with one of the comments of Jennifer Mather when she says that even in the natural habitat of animals, we can modify their comportment. She gives the example of an octopus who will modify his actions and be less on guards if humans are around which makes them vulnerable for predators. She says that we can’t wait for the proof to give the right of life to every animal because it will be too late. She also says the criteria of self-other-conscience doesn’t work and everything is very specific to every animal: we can’t do an experiment with many octopuses: they will kill each other. I find this aargument interesting since I am of the ones thinking intelligence is a matter of adaptation in your environment. I think there is no genereal criterion that we can apply to every species for saying one is sentient and deserves to be protected and the other is not.
ReplyDeleteProf. Mather argued that all scientists should adopt a school and told us how she is giving the example. Earlier, Joshua Plotnik also showed us how he is applying that sort of principle in Asia. Following that, a student had commented that being given a chance to interact emotionally with the elephants might be the best way to prevent them treating them badly after they become adults, encouraging the ivory trade, etc.
ReplyDeleteEach animal cognition researcher adopting an elementary school worldwide definitely sounds like a great idea. But I also could think of counter arguments people would use to argue against generalizing this practice: kids nowadays have so much in their curriculum. Why not instead add philosophy? Logic? What shall will we remove in order to fit X in?
Prof Mathers, who teaches in Alberta, replied that she went straight to the teachers and that as long as it's presented in an entertaining way, it's compatible with the local curriculum. Also, it's a once per years kind of event.
Prof Dukas added that it's already being done in the USA, as part of an established program.
Thank you very much for the talk, it was very interesting. During the panel, I asked if there was a hardwired process in humans that would make our generalized fear or disgust response to insects and Jennifer mentioned there was none and it was mostly education. Could you elaborate on your approach or the particular angle that you would advise to take to change the mind of people in regards to them? More specifically, do you think the approach in cognitive and behavioral therapy of exposition and prevention of response possible with such insects as mosquitoes?
ReplyDelete